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Abstract. In this paper we investigate a probability logic with condi-
tional probability operators. The logic (denoted LPP) allows making
statements such as CP≥s(α | β), with the intended meaning ”the condi-
tional probability of α given β is at least s”. Conditional probabilities are
deﬁned in the usual Kolmogorv style: P(α | β)=
P(α∧β)
P(β) , P(β) > 0. A
possible-world approach is used to give semantics to probability formulas.
An inﬁnitary axiomatic system for our logic is given and the correspond-
ing strong completeness theorem is proved. It is proved that the logic is
decidable.
1S y n t a x
The language L of LPP consists of a countable set I = {p1,p 2,...} of proposi-
tional letters, classical connectives ∧ and ¬, a list of unary probabilistic operators
P≥s for every rational number s ∈ [0,1], a list of binary probability operators
CP≥s for every rational number s ∈ [0,1], and a binary probability operator
CP≤0.
The set ForC
LPP of all classical propositional formulas is deﬁned inductively
as the smallest set X containing propositional letters and closed under the usual
formation rules: if α and β belong to X,t h e n¬α, α ∧ β are in X.E l e m e n t so f
ForC
LPP will be denoted by α,β,...The set ForP
LPP of all probability formulas
is the smallest set Y containing all formulas of the forms: P≥sα, CP≥s(α | β),
CP≤0(α | β), for all α,β ∈ ForC
LPP and each rational number s from [0,1],
and closed under the formation rules: if A and B belong to Y ,t h e n¬A and
A ∧ B are in Y . The formulas from ForP
LPP will be denoted by A,B,... Let
For LPP = ForC
LPP ∪ ForP
LPP. The formulas from For LPP will be denoted by
Φ, Ψ,...
As it can be seen, neither mixing of pure propositional formulas and prob-
ability formulas, nor nested probability operators are allowed. For example,
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¬P≥0.5p1 ∧ CP≥1(p1 → p2 | p2) is a syntactically correct formula of the LPP,
while CP≥0.5(p1 | CP≥0.5(p1 | P≥1p1)) and p1 ∧ P≥1p1 are not.
We use the usual abbreviations for the other classical connectives ∨, →, ↔.
For every rationalnumber s from [0,1] we denote ¬P≥s(α)b yP<s(α), P≥1−s(¬α)
by P≤s(α), ¬P≤s(α)b yP>s(α), and P≥s(α)∧P≤s(α)b yP=s(α)A l s o ,f o rs  =0 ,
we use the following abbreviations: CP<s(α | β)
def = ¬CP≥s(α | β), CP≤s(α |
β)
def = CP≥1−s(¬α | β), CP>s(α | β)
def = ¬CP≤s(α | β), and CP=s(α | β)
def =
CP≥s(α | β) ∧ CP≤s(α | β). For α ∈ ForC
LPP,a n dA ∈ ForP
LPP, we abbreviate
both α ∧¬ α and A ∧¬ A by ⊥ letting the context determine the meaning.
2S e m a n t i c s
The semantics for For LPP will be based on the possible-world approach.
Deﬁnition 1. An LPP−model is a structure M =  W,H,µ,v  where:
– W is a nonempty set of objects called worlds,
– H is an algebra of subsets of W,a n d
– µ is a ﬁnitely additive measure, µ : H → [0,1],
– v : W × I →{ true,false} provides for each world w ∈ W at w o - v a l u e d
evaluation of the propositional letters, that is v(w,p) ∈{ true,false},f o r
each propositional letter p ∈ I and each world w ∈ W; a truth-evaluation
v(w,·) is extended to classical propositional formulas as usual.
If M is an LPP−model and α ∈ ForC
LPP,t h es e t{w : v(w,α)=true} is
denoted by [α]M. We will omit the subscript M from [α]M and write [α]i fM
is clear from the context. An LPP−model M =  W,H,µ,v  is measurable if
[α]M ∈ H for every formula α ∈ ForC
LPP. In this section we focus on the class
of all measurable models (denoted by LPPMeas).
Deﬁnition 2. The satisﬁability relation fulﬁlls the following conditions for ev-
ery LPP−model M =  W,H,µ,v  and every world w ∈ W:
– if α ∈ ForC
LPP, M,w|= α iﬀ v(w,α)=true,
– if α ∈ ForC
LPP, M,w|= P≥sα iﬀ µ([α]) ≥ s,
– α,β ∈ ForC
LPP, M,w|= CP≥s(α | β) iﬀ either
µ([α]∩[β])
µ([β]) ≥ s and µ([β]) > 0,
or µ([β]) = 0,
– α,β ∈ ForC
LPP, M,w|= CP≤0(α | β) iﬀ µ([α] ∩ [β]) = 0 and µ([β]) > 0,
– if A ∈ ForP
LPP, M,w|= ¬A iﬀ M,w |= A,
– if A,B ∈ ForP
LPP, M,w|= A ∧ B iﬀ M,w|= A and M,w|= B.
Af o r m u l aΦ ∈ For LPP is satisﬁable if there is an LPPMeas-model M =  W,H,µ,v ,
and a world w ∈ W such that M,w |= Φ; Φ is valid in an LPPMeas-model
M =  W,H,µ,v  (denoted M |= Φ), if for every world w ∈ W, M,w|= Φ; Φ is
valid if for every LPPMeas-model M, M |= Φ;as e to fT formulas is satisﬁable
if there is an LPPMeas-model M =  W,H,µ,v ,a n daw o r l dw ∈ W such that
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3 Axiomatic system
The axiomatic system AxLPP for LPP contains the following axiom schemata:
1. all ForC
LPP−instances of classical propositional tautologies,
2. all ForP
LPP−instances of classical propositional tautologies,
3. P≥0α,
4. P≤rα → P<sα, s>r ,
5. P<sα → P≤sα,
6. (P≥rα ∧ P≥sβ ∧ P≥1(¬α ∨¬ β)) → P≥min(1,r+s)(α ∨ β),
7. (P≤rα ∧ P<sβ) → P<r+s(α ∨ β), r + s ≤ 1,
8. CP≥s(α | β) ∧ P≥tβ → P≥s·t(α ∧ β), t>0,
9. (P=0(α ∧ β) ∧ P>0β) ↔ CP≤0(α | β),
and inference rules:
1. From Φ and Φ → Ψ infer Ψ, Φ,Ψ ∈ ForC
LPP or Φ,Ψ ∈ ForP
LPP,
2. From α infer P≥1α,
3. From A → P≥s− 1
kα, for every integer k ≥ 1
s,i n f e rA → P≥sα.
4. From A → (P≥rβ → P≥r·s(α ∧ β)), for every rational number r from [0,1],
infer A → CP≥s(α | β).
AxLPP extends the axiomatic system for the (unconditional) probability logic
analyzed in [7]. The new axioms 8 and 9, and Rule 4 express the standard
deﬁnition of conditional probability. Rule 4 relates unary and binary probability
operators. The inference rules 3 and 4 are inﬁnitary.
Deﬁnition 3. Af o r m u l aΦ is deducible from a set T of formulas (T   Φ)i f
there is an at most countable sequence of formulas Φ0,Φ 1,...,Φ, such that every
Φi is an axiom or a formula from the set T, or it is derived from the preceding
formulas by an inference rule.
Af o r m u l aΦ is a theorem (  Φ) if it is deducible from the empty set, and a
proof for α is the corresponding sequence of formulas.
As e tT of formulas is consistent if there is at least one formula from ForC
LPP,
and at least one formula from ForP
LPP that are not deducible from T,o t h e r w i s e
T is inconsistent.
A consistent set T of formulas is said to be maximal consistent if the following
holds:
– for every α ∈ ForC
LPP,i fT   α,t h e nα ∈ T and P≥1α ∈ T,a n d
– for every A ∈ ForP
LPP,e i t h e rA ∈ T or ¬A ∈ T.
As e tT is deductively closed if for every Φ ∈ For LPP,i fT   Φ,t h e nΦ ∈ T.114 Zoran Ognjanovi´ c, Nebojˇ sa Ikodinovi´ c, and Zoran Markovi´ c
4 Soundness and Completeness
Now, following the ideas from [6,8,10], we can prove the extended completeness
theorem for the class LPPMeas.
Theorem 1 (Soundness theorem). The axiomatic system AxLPP is sound
with respect to the class of LPPMeas-models.
In order to prove the completeness theorems for our logic, we follow the
Henkin procedure. We begin with some auxiliary statements. Then, we describe
how a consistent set T of formulas can be extended to a suitable maximal con-
sistent set, and how a canonical model can be constructed out of such maximal
consistent sets.
Theorem 2. 1. (Deduction theorem) If T is a set of formulas, Φ is a for-
mula, and T ∪{ Φ} Ψ,t h e nT   Φ → Ψ,w h e r eΦ and Ψ are either both
classical or both probability formulas.
2. Let α, β be classical formulas. Then:
(a)   P≥1(α → β) → (P≥sα → P≥sβ),
(b)   P≥rα → P≥sα, r>s ,
(c) if α → β is a classical tautology, then   CP≥1(β | α),
(d)   CP≥1(α | β) → CP≥s(α | β),
(e)   P=0β → CP=1(α | β).
Theorem 3. Every consistent set of formulas can be extended to a maximal
consistent set.
The next theorem summarizes some obvious properties of the maximal con-
sistent sets of formulas.
Theorem 4. Let T be a maximal consistent set of formulas. Let Φ and Ψ be
either both classical or both probability formulas, and let α be a classical formula.
Then the following hold:
1. If Φ ∈ T,t h e n¬Φ  ∈ T.
2. Φ ∧ Ψ ∈ T iﬀ Φ ∈ T and Ψ ∈ T.
3. If T   Φ,t h e nΦ ∈ T, i.e. T is deductively closed.
4. If Φ ∈ T and Φ → Ψ ∈ T,t h e nΨ ∈ T.
5. If P≥sα ∈ T,a n ds ≥ r,t h e nP≥rα ∈ T.
6. If r is a rational number and r =s u p {s : P≥sα ∈ T},t h e nP≥rα ∈ T.
Using the maximal consistent extension T of the set T, we can deﬁne a tuple
M =  W,H,µ,v ,w h e r e :
– W contains all classical propositional interpretations of the set I of propo-
sitional letters,
– for every α ∈ ForC
LPP,[ α]={w ∈ W | w |= α} and H = {[α] | α ∈
ForC
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– µ : H → [0,1], such that µ([α]) = sup{s : P≥s(α) ∈ T},
– v : W ×I →{ true,false} is an assignment such that for every world w ∈ W
and every propositional letter p ∈ I, v(w,p)=true iﬀ w |= p.
Note that, since w’s are classical propositional interpretations, in the above def-
inition of M we use w |= α to denote that the interpretation w satisﬁes α in the
sense of classical propositional logic.
Theorem 5. The above deﬁned structure M is an LPPMeas-model.
Theorem 6 (Completeness theorem). Every consistent set T of formulas
has a model from LPPMeas.
5 Decidability
Since, it is well known that there is a procedure to decide whether a classical
propositional formula is satisﬁable, to prove decidability of LPP, it is enough
to show that satisﬁability problem for probability formulas is decidable. We will
use the linear programming theory to show that.
Let A ∈ ForP
LPP be a probability formula and p1,...,p n be a list of all
propositional letters from A.A na t o ma of A is a formula ±p1 ∧...±pn,w h e r e
±pi is either pi,o r¬pi. For diﬀerent atoms ai and aj we have   ai →¬ aj.
Thus, in every LPPMeas−model µ(ai ∨aj)=µ(ai)+µ(aj). Using propositional
reasoning and the fact that if   α ↔ β,t h e n  P≥sα ↔ P≥sβ,i ti se a s yt os h o w
that every probability formula A is equivalent to a formula:
DNF(A)=
m  
i=1
ki  
j=1
Xi,j(p1,...,p n)
called a disjunctive normal form of A,w h e r e :Xi,j is a probability operator from
the set: {P≥si,j, P<si,j, CP≥si,j, CP<si,j, CP≤0, ¬CP≤0} (si,j is a rational num-
ber from [0,1]), and Xi,j(p1,...,p n) denotes that propositional formula which
is in the scope of the probability operator Xi,j is in the complete disjunctive
normal form, i.e. the propositional formula is a disjunction of the atoms of A.
The formula A is satisﬁable iﬀ at least one disjunct from DNF(A)i ss a t -
isﬁable. Let ±P≥r1α1, ..., ±P≥raαa, ±CP≥s1(β1 | γ1), ..., ±CPsb(βb | γb),
±CP≤0(δ1 | η1), ..., ±CP≤0(δc | ηc), a + b + c = ki,b ea ne n u m e r a t i o n
of all probability formulas which appear as conjuncts in some disjunct Di =  k
j=1 Xi,j(p1,...,p n)f r o mDNF(A), where ±P≥r ∈{ P≥r,P <r}, ±CP≥r ∈
{CP≥r,CP <r},a n d±CP≤0 ∈{ CP≤0,¬CP≤0}.
Let the measure of the atom ai be denoted by xi.W eu s eai ∈ α to denote
that the atom ai appears in the complete disjunctive normal form of the classical
propositional formula α. The disjunct Di is satisﬁable iﬀ at least one of the
following ﬁnitely many systems of linear equalities and inequalities is satisﬁable:
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xi ≥ 0, (i =1 ,...,2n)  
ai∈αk xi ≥ rk,i f±P≥rk = P≥rk,( k =1,...,a)  
ai∈αk xi <r k,i f±P≥rk = P<rk,( k =1,...,a)  
ai∈γk xi > 0a n d
 
ai∈βk∧γk xi ≥ sk
 
ai∈γk xi,o r
 
ai∈γk xi =0 ,i f
±CP≥sk = CP≥sk,( k =1,...,b)  
ai∈γk xi > 0a n d
 
ai∈βk∧γk xi <s k
 
ai∈γk xi,i f±CP≥sk = CP<sk,
(k =1,...,b)  
ai∈ηk xi > 0a n d
 
ai∈δk∧ηk xi =0 ,i f±CP≤0 = CP≤0,( k =1,...,c)  
ai∈ηk xi > 0a n d
 
ai∈δk∧ηk xi > 0, or
 
ai∈ηk xi =0 ,i f±CP≤0 = ¬CP≤0,
(k =1,...,c)
Since the problem of satisﬁability of A is reduced to the linear systems solving
problem, we have:
Theorem 7. The logic LPP is decidable.
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